It isn’t too often we get employment law cases in front of the U.S. Supreme Court, so when they talk about something as significant as Title VII, we take notice.  The Court recently reviewed the Eighth Circuit decision in Muldrow v. St. Louis, which discussed whether an employee transfer could constitute an adverse action violative of discrimination laws.

The facts of the case were fairly simple.  Muldrow, a female, is a sergeant in the St. Louis Police Department.  For nine years, she worked as a plainclothes officer in the department’s specialized Intelligence Division, where she investigated high profile cases, oversaw the Gang Unit and Gun Crimes unit.  She had FBI credentials, an unmarked take-home squad, and worked a standard Monday through Friday schedule.  She received good reviews for her work.  However, when a new division commander came into the picture, Muldrow was transferred out of the division to work as a patrol sergeant and was replaced by a male sergeant.  The Commander testified that the replacement sergeant seemed a better fit for the Division’s “very dangerous” work (probably much to the City’s attorney’s chagrin).  She no longer had a take-home car, worked in a uniform, and had a less predictable schedule.

Muldrow sued, but her claim was dismissed on summary judgment because the lower courts decided that a transfer did not constitute a significant adverse action.  The Supreme Court took the case on to resolve a difference in circuit opinions as to whether a transfer could be considered discriminatory.

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  The Court found that the transfer implicated terms and conditions as it changed the “what, where, and when of her police work.”  Unlike retaliation claims, regular discrimination claims require plaintiffs “show that the [action] brought about some ‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or condition.”  In contrast to what the lower courts stated, there is no requirement that the treatment be “serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.”

The Court stated that employees need not meet a “heightened threshold of harm,” in order to show adverse treatment.  All Muldrow was required to show was that the transfer must have left her worse off, but not significantly so.  With that, the case was remanded for resolution at the lower courts.

This is a fairly significant change, especially in the Eighth Circuit, where this case originated.  However, what this means is that employers cannot take actions against employees based on immutable characteristics, such as race, gender, or religious affiliation.  If action is taken, the business purpose should be documented to show that it was not taken for an illegal reason.  If you, or your organization need assistance with managing employees, or defending your employment-related decisions, contact Wiley Reber Law, for legal advice that works.