During Minnesota’s somewhat busy summer of new legislation, a number of significant cases took place impacting the world of employment and labor law. In the case of Williams v. Kincaid, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the appeal, a significant decision was made in the world of ADA law.
The case is actually not an employment case. Williams was arrested and placed in jail, and served six months in the Fairfax (VA) County Adult Detention Center. Williams is a transgender woman with gender dysphoria. While she was initially placed among the female population of the prison, after a nurse’s physical examination, it was determined that Williams still had the genitalia with which she was born, and sent to the male population, which was consistent with jail policy. Williams was also not provided her medications for her gender dysphoria, and had to give up the women’s clothing she had previously received to wear men’s clothing.
Upon her release, Williams sued the sheriff, the corrections staff, and the medical staff of the jail, alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. The sheriff moved to have the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims dismissed, stating that gender dysphoria is an identity disorder not resulting from physical impairments. The district court accepted this argument and dismissed the claims. Williams appealed.
In its decision, the Fourth Circuit noted that the ADA excludes from the definition of disability, “Transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, and other sexual behavior disorders.” Williams argued that gender dysphoria is not a gender identity disorder, and even if it were, it results from a physical basis that places it outside the scope of the statutes’ exclusions.
In response, the court found that at the time the ADA was created, gender dysphoria was not considered a gender identity disorder; it didn’t even exist as a diagnosis in 1990. The court provided research that gender identity disorder and gender dysphoria were different conditions with different symptoms. As such, the court did not consider gender dysphoria to fall into the realm of gender identity disorders and was not excluded from protection. The court concluded that in “light of the broad scope of the ADA and the implementing regulations,” Williams alleged sufficient facts to lead to the inference that her gender dysphoria resulted from physical impairments, and thus warranted protection under the ADA.
On top of this, the court found that if the ADA excluded both gender identity disorders and gender dysphoria from its protection, it would discriminate against transgender people as a class, and implicate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It saw “no legitimate reason why Congress would intend to exclude from the ADA’s protections transgender people who suffer from gender dysphoria.” The court reversed the dismissal.
In June of this year, the U.S. Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the decision of the Fourth Circuit, and declined. As such, while the different circuits are not bound by the Fourth Circuit’s decision, this is currently the preeminent decision on the application of the ADA for individuals with gender dysphoria. As such, employers should both recognize and work with individuals who provide documentation of the condition. In Minnesota, as gender identity is already a protected status for employees, there should be little doubt that employers need to be considerate of employees’ restrictions from that regard.
If you, or your organization need assistance in working with employees requesting accommodation for any medical condition, contact Wiley Reber Law, for accommodation advice that works.